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Abstract 
Field experiments documenting positive treatment effects have a strong policy 
message: Scale up! However, such experiments are typically implemented under close 
supervision of the research group in charge of the study. In contrast, scaling up 
would typically imply relying on local organization. It is not obvious that the positive 
treatment effects identified in the research driven intervention can be replicated 
locally. The present study explicitly addresses this challenge by analyzing the local 
version of a research driven business training program among small-scale 
microfinance entrepreneurs in Tanzania. Comparing the local program with the 
research-led program in terms of attendance and subjective evaluation, we find that 
success in local implementation cannot be taken for granted. Moreover, an analysis 
of long-term outcomes also demonstrates a weaker impact of the local program. We 
conclude that the estimated effect of research-led interventions should be interpreted 
as an upper bound of what can be achieved when scaling up such interventions 
locally. 
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1. Introduction 
Field experiments are widely used in developing countries to investigate a host of 
issues of importance to policy makers, including the role of community participation 
in improving health services (Björkman and Svensson 2009), the effect of deworming 
on educational outcomes (Kremer and Miguel 2003), and the effect of business 
training on microenterprise development (Karlan and Valdivia, 2011, Berge et al., 
2011). These studies evaluate carefully implemented interventions, closely monitored 
by a research team. To draw policy implications, however, one would like to know 
what the effect of a program is when the researchers have stepped back. Are local 
stakeholders able to implement similar programs?  
The difficulty of scaling up is particularly pressing when the program is complex, 
where the intervention stretches over time, and where the organizational setting and 
skills of the service providers matter greatly for the quality of the services provided. 
As emphasized by Sternberg et al. (2006) when analyzing the challenges of scaling up 
educational programs: “Programs often work on a small scale due to adoption by 
highly motivated individuals. Moreover, in the context of small-scale 
implementations, a key factor is often the proximity of the creators of the program to 
its first adopters and implementers. This proximity implies not only the physical 
proximity, but also the proximity of ideas and beliefs - those educators who are 
willing to try new programs usually see a value in doing so and thus are more 
predisposed to raise the odds of the program to succeed. Therefore, programs may 
work on a small scale, but they fail when they are upscaled because the initial sample 
of the program’s deliverers was not representative of the larger population” (pp. 206-
207). 
In Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2010) and Berge et al. (2011), we document by a 
randomized field experiment that a business training program given by professional 
trainers from the University of Dar es Salaam Entrepreneurship Centre (UDEC) 
significantly affected business skills, entrepreneurial attitudes, business practices, and 
business outcomes among microfinance clients of the microfinance institution 
Promotion of Rural Initiative and Development Enterprise (PRIDE) Tanzania. For 
PRIDE, the business training program was seen as a pilot project that, if successful, 
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would be scaled up in one form or another by the institution. However, two important 
questions remain: Can they implement the program? Should they implement it?  
The main focus of the present paper is on the first question. We analyze a local 
version of the intervention where some microfinance clients were offered training by 
internal credit officers, and compare it to the intervention using professional trainers 
from UDEC. This comparison sheds light on PRIDE’s ability to implement such a 
program. Outsourcing business training to professional trainers, such as UDEC, is 
expensive and hard to implement on a large scale in Tanzania, and thus an important 
question for PRIDE when considering whether to scale up is whether such a program 
can be offered in-house. Would the quality of an internal program be sufficiently high 
to attract the attention of the entrepreneurs? 
The second question is whether PRIDE should implement the program. In Berge et al. 
(2011), we document a positive impact of business training on business outcomes, in 
particular for male entrepreneurs. Thus, from a societal point of view, business 
training is likely to be beneficial. However, as stressed by Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch (2010), a microfinance institution typically balances social impacts on the 
one hand and financial sustainability on the other hand, and the impact of business 
training on the latter is not trivial.  
One motive for PRIDE to offer business training to its clients on a regular basis is 
clearly that this could provide a competitive edge over other microfinance institutions 
and, thus, attract more customers. Another argument in favor of business training is 
that the clients’ increased skills and potentially stronger loyalty to the institution 
could translate into higher loans and fewer repayment problems. But this is not 
necessarily the outcome. Indeed, a more knowledgeable and successful entrepreneur 
may find cheaper sources of finance outside the microfinance institution. If training 
triggers the exit of clients, the microfinance institution may become more reluctant to 
offer such services to its clients. Further, PRIDE’s decision on whether to offer the 
training would also depend on the clients’ willingness to pay for the service. Does 
PRIDE have to offer the program for free in order to make it attractive to the clients, 
or can the costs be covered by imposing a participation fee? We discuss these issues 
in the concluding part of the paper. 
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Our main finding is that the external training clearly worked better than the internal 
training. First, attendance was higher and the course was considered more beneficial 
by the externally trained entrepreneurs; second, the externally trained entrepreneurs 
gained more business knowledge and reported a higher level of happiness with their 
overall situation. Business knowledge, course satisfaction and general happiness were 
measured two and a half years after the training was completed, which suggests 
enduring differences in assessment and impact. Our results thus indicate that the 
impact of external research projects may represent an upper bound of what would be 
the impact if such projects were to be scaled up by a local organization. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the 
intervention, a business training program offered to microfinance entrepreneurs in Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania. Section 3 presents the data and the empirical strategy, with an 
emphasis on randomization procedures and the treatment-control balance, and Section 
4 reports the main results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The training program 
The business training program consisted of 21 sessions, each lasting 45 minutes, and 
was offered for free at the premises of the microfinance institution immediately after 
the weekly loan meeting of the clients. The aim of the program, which commenced in 
August 2008 and ended in January 2009, was to unleash entrepreneurship among the 
microfinance clients. It was developed by UDEC and piloted extensively.1 The course 
covered a range of topics, such as record keeping, marketing practices, customer care, 
and employee management. A participatory method was adopted, with the sessions 
focusing on real world examples in order to make the insights vivid for the clients. 
The trainers also encouraged the participants to learn from each other’s experiences, 
and to share their business challenges and problems.  
For capacity building purposes, PRIDE chose four of its most experienced credit 
officers to be involved in the training of a subset of the clients. The credit officers 
attended the sessions given by the professional trainers, and were also instructed and 
evaluated by them.  
                                                            
1 The training program is described in detail in Berge et al. (2011). 
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3. Empirical strategy 
We use a randomized field experiment to study PRIDE’s ability to implement the 
business training program using internal resources. 2  One group of clients was 
randomly assigned to being trained by professional trainers (external intervention), 
whereas another group of clients was assigned to receiving the same training from the 
internal credit officers (internal intervention). In all other respects, the training 
programs were identical. They covered the same content and were given at the same 
premises following the loan meeting of the clients. The two groups were also treated 
in the same manner by PRIDE. A snack and a soft drink were offered to all 
participants in each session, and everyone was given the incentive of receiving a 
graduation diploma if attending at least ten sessions. Thus, the only difference 
between the two interventions was the trainers. Given that the clients were randomly 
allocated to an internal or an external trainer, we can therefore identify the causal 
effect of replacing an external trainer by an internal trainer.  
3.1 Randomization procedures  
We selected two of PRIDE’s branches in Dar es Salaam, located in Magomeni and 
Buguruni respectively, for the interventions. The training was offered on Tuesdays in 
Magomeni and on Thursdays in Buguruni. The external training was offered to clients 
who had their loan meetings between 9 am and 1 pm, the internal training was offered 
to clients who had their loan meeting at 2 pm. We only included clients with PRIDE 
loans between 500 000 TZS (USD 335) and 1 000 000 TZS (USD 670), amounts that 
represent the second and third steps on the loan ladder in the group lending program. 
This was motivated by the fact that there are very high dropout rates among clients 
with smaller loans, and also that we wanted to avoid an excessively heterogeneous 
target group for the sessions. At the chosen time slots, there were 565 clients eligible 
for external training and 114 clients eligible for internal training. 
As loan groups are randomly assigned a loan meeting day and hour according to the 
availability of time slots at the branches of PRIDE, there is no reason to believe that 
                                                            
2 On the methodology of randomization, see Duflo et al. (2008). For a critical perspective, see Deaton 
(2010) and Rodrik (2009). 
6 
 
there is any systematic difference between the eligible clients according to the time of 
the loan meeting. This is also confirmed by our baseline data. There is, for example, 
no correlation between the sectors in which the entrepreneurs are involved and the 
time of their loan meeting. Thus, our working hypothesis is that the entrepreneurs 
were effectively randomly assigned to either external or internal training.  
The share of eligible clients that showed up at the first or second session was almost 
identical for the two groups, 290 out of 565 for the externally trained group (51.4%) 
and 59 out of 114 (51.8%) for the internally trained group. These clients constitute the 
sample of our analysis.3 There is no reason to assume that the selection process into 
the initial sessions differs between the externally trained group and the internally 
trained group.4 First, we used the same invitation letter for external and internal 
training, and there was no mentioning of who would be the instructor. Second, the 
external trainer played a leading role in the initial sessions also in the internal 
program.  
In sum, we argue that there should be no systematic difference between the pool of 
clients that initially showed up for the external training or the internal training. Hence, 
we shall think of the comparison between the clients receiving external training and 
                                                            
3 Focusing only on those who attended the first session gives very similar results to those reported here, 
but the sample size is naturally smaller. Note that our analysis is restricted to clients who received 
training. An alternative approach would be to include all eligible clients in the sample and conduct an 
intention to treat analysis. For the internal group, however, we only have detailed data on the clients 
actually attending the training, and thus we are restricted to a comparison of the treatment effect on the 
treated.  
4 There was a slight difference in recruitment procedure between the external and the internal group. 
For the external group, we conducted a baseline survey where we managed to interview 319 of the 565 
eligible clients. The baseline survey was presented to the entrepreneurs as an effort “to identify 
strategies to improve the functioning of microcredit institutions in Tanzania”, and, hence, they were not 
informed about the prospective business training course. After the baseline survey, the clients we had 
reached received an invitation to attend training. We did not conduct a baseline survey of the clients 
assigned to internal training because we did not initially plan to include them in the research part of the 
project. For this group, therefore, we invited all eligible clients who we could be reached at the loan 
meeting where the training was announced.  
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those receiving internal training as a randomized field experiment measuring the 
treatment effect on the treated. 
3.2 Treatmentcontrol balances 
Table 1 shows the balance on observables between the externally trained group and 
the internally trained group. There are no significant differences between the two 
groups on observable background variables, which indicates that the randomization 
procedure was successful.  
In 2011, we conducted a follow-up study of all the clients who received training. For 
both the internally and externally trained group, we collected information on their 
subjective rating of how beneficial they had found the course, conducted a business 
knowledge test, and also collected data on how happy they were with their overall 
situation. For the externally trained group, we also collected more detailed 
information on their business performance, but for practical reasons it was not 
feasible for us to collect such data for the internally trained group. 
In the follow-up study, we managed to reach 268 out of 290 in the externally trained 
group and 47 out of 59 in the internally trained group. As we show in the appendix, 
the follow-up sample is also balanced (Table A1), with the 34 clients that we did not 
reach in the follow-up survey differing from the interviewed sample only on one 
observable background variable, loan size (Table A2). The assignment to internal 
training is predictive of attrition (Table A3), however, and, therefore, we report in the 
appendix robustness checks of our main analysis (Table A4), adopting the approaches 
of Kling et al. (2007) and Lee (2009).5 Largely, our main results are not sensitive to 
various assumptions about the treatment effect for attriters.     
3.3. Econometric model 
The main strategy in the empirical analysis is to estimate the following equation: 
iiii XInternalY   10        (1) 
                                                            
5 These approaches are also adopted in other recent work on entrepreneurship training, see for example 
Karlan and Valdivia (2011) and Fairlie et al. (2012).  
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where Y is an outcome variable, Internal is a binary variable taking the value one if 
the entrepreneur was offered training by the internal instructor and zero if offered 
training by the external instructor, and X is a vector of control variables. Given that 
there are no systematic differences between the internally trained and the externally 
trained group,  is an estimate of the causal impact of receiving training from an 
internal trainer rather than an external trainer.6   
4. Results 
4.1 Attendance and subjective evaluation 
Is the local institution able to offer a business training program in-house that attracts 
the clients and is perceived as beneficial to them? To study this question, we consider 
attendance rates and the participants’ subjective evaluation of the course 
Figure 1 gives an overview of attendance over time for the two groups. As we have 
already reported in our discussion of the randomization procedure, the two groups had 
similar levels of attendance in the first and second session, but the attendance in the 
internally trained group clearly dropped below the attendance in the externally trained 
group in later sessions. On average, the clients in the externally trained group attended 
15.7 sessions and the clients in the internally trained group attended 13 sessions. 
There is also a large difference in the share that received a diploma (which required 
attending at least 10 sessions), 90% versus 66.6%. 
Given that the internal training and the external training took place at different times 
of day, one might worry that the timing itself may affect the ability to turn up at the 
training. For example, it might be more difficult to attend training in the afternoon 
than in the morning. To investigate this possibility, we collected data on loan meeting 
attendance, but we did not find any difference in attendance at loan meetings between 
the time slots assigned to external training and the time slot assigned to internal 
training  (t-test of equality, p=0.32).  
                                                            
6 As a robustness check, we have also calculated propensity score matching estimates, and they are in 
line with the treatment effects that are reported in the paper. 
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Low attendance may be an indication of the internal training being of lower quality, 
and in the follow-up study we asked the entrepreneurs how much they had benefited 
from the course. This was reported on a scale from 1 – 10, where 1 indicated no 
benefit at all and 10 indicated that they had benefited a lot. Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of the subjective evaluations, where we observe that the majority of 
participants seem to perceive the course to be beneficial, both in the externally trained 
group and the internally trained group. At the same time, we observe large differences 
between the two groups. The average score is 9 in the externally trained group and 7.6 
in the internally trained group, and there is also a large difference in the share of 
participants reporting the top score (54.9% versus 21.3%).  
Table 2 and Table 3 confirm the impressions from Figure 1 and Figure 2, 
respectively, and report precisely estimated causal effects of being assigned to an 
internal trainer rather than an external trainer. Both the attendance and subjective 
evaluation of the course are significantly lower in the internally trained group than in 
the externally trained group, and these effects are statistically highly significant. We 
also observe that introducing covariates has a negligible impact on the estimated 
Internal Training coefficient, which indicates that the results are not driven by a lack 
of balance between the two groups.   
In sum, we find that the course offered by the internal trainers was less well received 
by the entrepreneurs; the internal training had lower attendance and was perceived as 
less beneficial. We now turn to a study of whether the asymmetry in quality is also 
reflected in long-term outcomes for the entrepreneurs.  
4.2 Long-term outcomes  
We investigate long-term outcomes in two steps. First, we investigate the impact on 
the business knowledge of the entrepreneurs; second, we investigate the impact on 
their overall situation. Ideally, for the latter, we would have liked to include detailed 
business and household data, but such data are not available for the internally trained 
group. Thus, in studying the long-term effect on their overall situation, we have to 
restrict ourselves to general self-reported evaluations from the entrepreneurs.  
10 
 
We conducted a business knowledge test, where the entrepreneurs were tested in their 
understanding of the profit concept. They were introduced to the case of Juma, who 
makes fruit juice at Kimara, Dar es Salaam, and sells it in plastic containers to grocery 
stores and restaurants in different parts of the city. The entrepreneurs were given the 
task of deciding which expenses to include when calculating the profits of Juma’s 
business. They were given a list of different expenses, including irrelevant expenses 
like school fees and relevant expenses like payment for posters to advertise the juice. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the scores, where we observe a clear difference 
between the two groups; the average score was 81.7% for the externally trained group 
versus 75.7% for the internally trained group. And whereas 25.3% of the 
entrepreneurs in the externally trained group correctly identified all the cost items, 
only 12.8% did so in the internally trained group. Thus, the externally trained group 
showed significantly better understanding of the profit concept than the internally 
trained group, which we take as evidence of a difference in their knowledge of how to 
run a business. Regressions (1) and (2) in Table 4 show that the causal effect of 
having an internal trainer instead of an external trainer is precisely estimated both 
with and without covariates. We also note that the score on the test is significantly 
correlated with the entrepreneur’s level of education, which suggests that the test does 
indeed capture the entrepreneur’s level of human capital. 
To compare the wider impact of the training, we asked the entrepreneurs to evaluate 
their situation more broadly. Specifically, we asked them four questions on self-
reported happiness; how happy they were with life in general, with their economic 
situation, with their situation as entrepreneurs, and with their family situation. The 
reason for this broad set of questions was that we wanted to capture the possibility 
that the course had an impact not only on the performance of their businesses, but also 
potentially on their life situation in general, including family issues. One could for 
example imagine that the course could be beneficial both for monitoring household 
expenses and, for females in particular, in strengthening their bargaining power in the 
household. 
For each dimension, the participants were asked to report a score from 1 (very 
unhappy) to 5 (very happy). Not surprisingly, the individual responses across 
dimensions are highly correlated and the pattern when comparing the externally 
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trained group and the internally trained group is the same for each dimension. Thus, 
we focus on the average self-reported score for each entrepreneur. As shown in Figure 
4, the externally trained entrepreneurs are clearly happier with their situation than the 
internally trained entrepreneurs, and, as shown in regressions (3) and (4) in Table 3, 
this difference is precisely estimated, with and without covariates. We also observe 
that the younger entrepreneurs are happier than the older entrepreneurs, which is in 
line with findings in the literature on happiness (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008). 
In sum, the follow-up study shows systematic differences between the externally 
trained group and the internally trained groups in the long-term outcomes. 
Entrepreneurs in the externally trained group have more business knowledge and are 
more satisfied with their overall situation than entrepreneurs in the internally trained 
group.  
5. Concluding remarks 
Field experiments in poor countries have improved our understanding of the causal 
mechanisms at work in the development process. At the same time, from a policy 
perspective, there has been a lack of focus on how these research projects can be 
taken further and particularly on the extent to which they can be implemented and 
scaled up by local stakeholders. In this paper, we have discussed these challenges in 
light of a recent field experiment in Tanzania, where our research team organized a 
business training program for a group of entrepreneurs in the microfinance institution 
PRIDE.  
As part of this research project, we also implemented a capacity building component 
to assist PRIDE in scaling up the program by using internal resources. In particular, 
local credit officers were trained by professional instructors, and subsequently trained 
a subset of the clients. To evaluate this local version of the intervention, we randomly 
assigned entrepreneurs to external trainers or internal trainers. Our analysis shows that 
the internal training program systematically performed worse than the external 
training program. The internal training program attracted lower attendance, was 
considered less beneficial by the entrepreneurs, and was less effective in increasing 
the human capital of the entrepreneurs and improving their overall situation. We 
believe that this provides an important lesson to the present literature on field 
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experiments in developing countries. It shows that the impact of external research 
projects most likely represents an upper bound of what would be the impact if such 
projects were to be scaled up by a local organization. 
This certainly has implications for the second question that we raised in the 
introduction, namely whether the local institution should implement such a training 
program. It is beyond the scope of this paper to answer this question in detail, but let 
us still highlight some of the critical issues involved in this decision. First, even 
though we have shown that the effect of the internal training program is weaker than 
that of the external training program, we have not provided evidence of whether the 
internal training program overall had a positive impact on the entrepreneurs. To do 
this, we would need a control group receiving no training that could be compared to 
the internally trained group. An extensive evaluation of the internally trained group 
was not part of the initial research project, and thus no control group was established.7 
In Berge et al. (2011), we show that the external training program clearly had a 
positive impact on the entrepreneurs, so we cannot rule out that even though the 
impact from the internal training program was weaker than for the external training 
program, the overall effect may still be positive compared to not receiving training. 
Furthermore, one cannot exclude the possibility that the quality of the internal training 
would improve over time. 
In addition to considering the impact for the entrepreneurs, a microfinance institution 
would also have to study how beneficial the training program is for the organization 
itself. By offering a training program, a microfinance institution could potentially 
obtain both better clients (higher loan levels, fewer repayment problems) and more 
clients (existing clients stay, training attracts new clients). But it also runs the risk of 
better clients exiting the microcredit institution, since they may now have better 
access to credit from other sources. Two years after the baseline study, however, there 
is no evidence of (external) training affecting loan size, exit rates or default rates. This 
suggests that, to the extent that training has an impact on the financial sustainability of 
                                                            
7 To be able to compare the group assigned to internal training to the control group used in the impact 
analysis of the external training in Berge et al. (2011), we would have needed detailed data on the 
eligible clients in the internal group who did not attend training. 
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the institution, the impact would come from the recruitment of new clients rather than 
from existing clients.     
Offering a business training program is costly. Indeed, the variable cost per 
participant of the externally provided training program was estimated to be around 
100 000 TZS (USD 67). This covers compensation to the trainers, as well as expenses 
related to providing teaching materials and soft drinks to the participants. These costs 
would be lower if using internal trainers, and thus the cost-benefit analysis of using 
external versus internal trainers is not straightforward. The use of internal trainers 
certainly reduces costs, but, as we have documented, also seems to reduce the impact 
of such a training program. We do not have detailed data on the costs of internal 
trainers, and thus we cannot elicit more details on this trade-off. 
A relevant question for the microfinance institution, when considering whether to 
offer training in-house or not, is whether at least part of their costs can be covered by 
a participation fee. How much are entrepreneurs willing to pay for such a training 
program? In a follow-up survey conducted in mid-2009, we asked both the externally 
trained and the untrained entrepreneurs a hypothetical question on the willingness to 
pay for such a training program. Specifically, we asked them: “Imagine that you were 
given the opportunity to participate in a 20-session (with 60 minutes per session) 
entrepreneurship training course catered to your level. What is the maximum amount 
you would be willing to pay per session?” It is well-known that one should interpret 
such responses with care, since they may reflect strategic reasoning and not reveal the 
underlying true preferences for receiving training. Still, we find it interesting that the 
median self-reported willingness to pay in both the untrained group and the externally 
trained group was 20 000 TZS (approximately USD 13), which is one fifth of the 
estimated cost of offering such a course using the external trainers. Presumably, 
however, PRIDE can organize the course cheaper in-house. Our numbers therefore 
indicate that it may be possible for PRIDE to cover a significant part of its costs 
through participation fees. 
Our study highlights the importance of investigating the local capacity and local 
willingness to build on the lessons from a research driven field experiment. Further 
research is clearly needed in this area, to ensure that not only researchers, but also the 
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local communities, benefit from the many important field experiments presently 
conducted in developing countries. 
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Table 1: Treatmentcontrol balance (full sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Internal Group External Group Difference       
Female   0.61 0.63 0.61 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) 
Age   39.20 37.59 39.53 -1.94 
 (0.45) (0.90) (0.51) (1.19) 
Loan Size 753.01 754.24 752.76 1.48 
 12.74 (31.27) (13.97) (34.04) 
Education 7.82 7.83 7.82 0.01 
 
Branch 
(0.12) 
0.49 
(0.03) 
(0.29) 
0.44 
(0.07) 
(0.13) 
0.50 
(0.03) 
(0.31) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
Observations 349 59 290  
Note: The table reports average values. Female is a dummy variable with a value of one if the 
participant is a female. Age is expressed in number of years. Loan size denotes the loan size in PRIDE 
in 2008, in thousand Tanzanian shillings. Education is the number of years of schooling. Branch is a 
dummy variable, which takes the value one if the branch is Magomeni and zero if it is Buguruni. 
Standard errors are in parentheses: *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2: Attendance & Diploma  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Attendance      Attendance     Diploma       Diploma      
Internal Training -2.714** -2.569** -0.239*** -0.237*** 
 (1.067) (1.025) (0.080) (0.078) 
Education  0.136  -0.003 
  (0.120)  (0.008) 
Age  0.045  -0.000 
  (0.034)  (0.002) 
Female  -0.905  -0.017 
  (0.605)  (0.039) 
Loan Size  -0.001  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Branch  0.700  0.025 
  (0.603)  (0.041) 
Constant 15.714*** 13.545*** 0.900*** 0.955*** 
 (0.291) (2.111) (0.018) (0.143) 
Observations 349 349 349 349 
Note: Attendance is the number of sessionss (1-21) the clients participated in. Diploma is a dummy 
variable, taking the value one if the participants attended 10 or more of the sessions, thereby qualifying 
for a diploma awarded at the graduation ceremony. Internal training is a dummy variable, taking the 
value one if the training is provided by internal trainers and zero if the training is provided by external 
trainers.  Education is the number of years of schooling. Age is expressed in number of years. Female 
is a dummy variable with a value of one if the participant is a female. Loan size denotes the loan size in 
PRIDE in 2008, in thousand Tanzanian shillings.  Branch is a dummy variable, which takes the value 
one if the branch is Magomeni and zero if it is Buguruni. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.         
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3: Benefit of training 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Benefit      Benefit      Max Benefit      Max Benefit     
Internal Training -1.438*** -1.417*** -0.336*** -0.322*** 
 (0.282) (0.286) (0.061) (0.061) 
Education  0.040  0.015 
  (0.039)  (0.012) 
Age  0.012  0.007** 
  (0.011)  (0.003) 
Female  -0.117  -0.067 
  (0.186)  (0.057) 
Loan Size  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Branch  0.078  0.005 
  (0.192)  (0.054) 
Constant 9.034*** 8.454*** 0.549*** 0.210 
 (0.099) (0.676) (0.030) (0.192) 
Observations 315 315 315 315 
Note: Benefit is the self-reported score of how much the entrepreneur benefited from the course (1-10), 
Max Benefit is a dummy variable, taking the value one if the entrepreneur self-reported the top score 
(10). Internal training is a dummy variable, taking the value one if the training is provided by internal 
trainers and zero if the training is provided by external trainers.  Education is the number of years of 
schooling. Age is expressed in number of years. Female is a dummy variable with a value of one if the 
participant is a female. Loan size denotes the loan size in PRIDE in 2008, in thousand Tanzanian 
shillings. Branch is a dummy variable, which takes the value one if the branch is Magomeni and zero if 
it is Buguruni. Standard errors clustered at loan group in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
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Table 4: Knowledge & Happiness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Knowledge     Knowledge     Happiness       Happiness     
Internal Training -0.054** -0.056** -0.225** -0.208** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.108) (0.104) 
Education  0.012***  0.001 
  (0.004)  (0.016) 
Age  -0.001  0.008** 
  (0.001)  (0.004) 
Female  -0.024  -0.012 
  (0.018)  (0.069) 
Loan Size  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Branch  0.025  -0.140* 
  (0.017)  (0.076) 
Constant 0.811*** 0.713*** 4.186*** 3.857*** 
 (0.009) (0.058) (0.041) (0.242) 
Observations 315 315 315 315 
Note: Knowledge is the percentage of correct answers in the knowledge test. Happiness is the average 
of the self-reported happiness on four dimensions (1-5). 11 entrepreneurs did not report on one of the 
four dimensions, and for them we use the average in the other three dimensions. The results are not 
sensitive to excluding these entrepreneurs. Internal training is a dummy variable, taking the value one 
if the training is provided by internal trainers and zero if the training is provided by external trainers.  
Education is the number of years of schooling. Age is expressed in number of years. Female is a 
dummy variable with a value of one if the participant is a female. Loan size denotes the loan size in 
PRIDE in 2008, in thousand Tanzanian shillings.  Branch is a dummy variable, which takes the value 
one if the branch is Magomeni and zero if it is Buguruni. Standard errors clustered at loan group  in 
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Figure 1: Attendance per session 
 
Note: The figure shows the share of participants in our sample attending each of the sessions (3-21), by 
external training and internal training.  
 
Figure 2: Subjective evaluation  
 
Note: The figure shows the participants’ subjective evaluation of how much they benefited from the 
course, by internal training and external training. For each score on the scale from 1 (not benefited at 
all) to 10 (benefited a lot), the figures show the share of participants reporting this score.  
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Figure 3: Business knowledge  
 
Note: The figure shows the participants’ performance on a business knowledge test, by internal 
training and external training. For each score on the test, measured as percentage correct answers, the 
figure shows the share of participants obtaining this score.  
Figure 4: Self-reported happiness 
 
Note: The figure shows the participants’ happiness, by internal training and external training. 
Happiness is the average of the self-reported happiness on four dimensions. 11 entrepreneurs did not 
report on one of the four dimensions, and for them we use the average in the other three dimensions. 
For each score on the scale from 1 (very unhappy) to 5 (very happy), the figure shows the share of 
participants reporting this score.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Treatmentcontrol balance (follow-up sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Internal Group External Group Difference       
Female   0.60 0.60 0.61 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) 
Age   39.12 37.00 39.49 -2.05* 
 (0.45) (1.04) (0.54) (1.35) 
Loan Size 746.03 729.79 748.88 -19.09 
 13.42 (34.93) (14.55) (37.70) 
Education 7.83 7.96 7.80 0.16 
 
Branch 
(0.12) 
0.49 
(0.03) 
(0.35) 
0.46 
(0.07) 
(0.13) 
0.50 
(0.03) 
(0.34) 
-0.03 
(0.08) 
Observations 315 47 268  
Note: The table reports average values. Female is a dummy variable with a value of one if the 
participant is a female. Age is expressed in number of years. Loan size denotes the loan size in PRIDE 
in 2008, in thousand Tanzanian shillings. Education is the number of years of schooling. Branch is a 
dummy variable with the the value one if the branch is Magomeni and zero if it is Buguruni. Standard 
errors clustered at loan group  in parentheses.  *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A2: Attrition balance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Interviewed 
sample 
Attrition 
sample 
Difference       
Female   0.61 0.60 0.70 0.10 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09) 
Age   39.20 39.12 39.94 -0.82 
 (0.45) (0.48) (1.10) (1.51) 
Loan Size 753.01 746.03 817.65 -71.61* 
 12.74 (13.42) (39.49) (42.85) 
Education 7.82 7.83 7.77 0.06 
 
Branch 
(0.12) 
0.49 
(0.03) 
(0.12) 
0.49 
(0.03) 
(0.35) 
0.50 
(0.09) 
(0.39) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
Observations 349 315 34  
Note: The table reports average values. Female is a dummy variable with a value of one if the 
participant is a female. Age is expressed in number of years. Loan size denotes the loan size in PRIDE 
in 2008, in thousand Tanzanian shillings. Education is the number of years of schooling. Branch is a 
dummy variable, which takes the value one if the branch is Magomeni and zero if it is Buguruni. 
Standard errors are in parentheses: *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A3: Predicting attrition 
 (1) (2) 
Internal Training -0.128** -0.130** 
 (0.052) (0.052) 
Education  0.001 
  (0.007) 
Age  -0.001 
  (0.001) 
Female  -0.035 
  (0.031) 
Loan Size  -0.000 
  (0.000) 
Branch  -0.014 
  (0.032) 
Constant 0.924*** 1.067*** 
 (0.017) (0.095) 
Observations 349 349 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable with the value of one if the client was reached in the 
follow-up study. Education is the number of years of schooling. Age is expressed in number of years. 
Female is a dummy variable with a value of one if the participant is a female. Loan size denotes the 
loan size in PRIDE in 2008, in thousand Tanzanian shillings.  Branch is a dummy variable with the 
value one if the branch is Magomeni and zero if it is Buguruni. Standard errors clustered at loan group  
in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A4: Bounds analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Lower Lee -0.20 S.D -0.10 S.D -0.05 S.D Unadj. +0.05 S.D +0.10 S.D +0.20 S.D Upper 
Lee 
Benefit  -1.271*** -1.300*** -1.355*** -1.383*** -1.417*** -1.438*** -1.466*** -1.521*** -1.920*** 
 (0.296) (0.228) (0.227) (0.226) (0.286) (0.226) (0.225) (0.226) (0.265) 
Max Benefit  -0.253*** -0.298*** -0.311*** -0.317*** -0.322*** -0.329*** -0.335*** -0.347*** -0.412*** 
 (0.064) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.061) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.062) 
Knowledge -0.028 -0.045** -0.050** -0.052** -0.056** -0.056** -0.058*** -0.063*** -0.095*** 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) 
Happiness-Index -0.088 -0.185** -0.202** -0.210** -0.208** -0.227*** -0.236*** -0.253*** -0.379*** 
 (0.105) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.104) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.106) 
Observations 278 349 349 349 315 349 349 349 278 
Note: The table reports bounds analysis for Internal Training variable in Table 3 and Table 4, using various assumptions about the treatment effect for 
attriters. Each reported coefficient is from a separate regression. Columns (1) and (9) report the lower and upper Lee-bound (Lee, 2009). Columns (2)-(4) 
and (6)-(8) impute to the lower (upper) bound the mean minus (plus) a specified standard deviation multiple of the observed external training group 
distribution to the non-responders in the external training group, and the mean plus (minus) the standard deviation multiple of the observed internal training 
group distribution to non-responders in the internal training group (Kling et al., 2007). Column (7) reports the unadjusted estimates. Benefit is the self-
reported score of how much the entrepreneur benefited from the course (1-10), Max Benefit is a dummy variable, taking the value one if the entrepreneur 
reported the top score (10). Knowledge is the percentage of correct answers in the knowledge test. Happiness is the average of the self-reported happiness on 
four dimensions (1-5). Bootstrapped standard errors (500 reps; unadjusted estimates are not bootstrapped) clustered at the loan group. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01 
 
